of its solution to the problem of how a priori concepts can refer to objects, which he then reinvokes in the Fourth Paralogism in order to refute "veil of perception" skepticism; and in the second edition, the First Analogy's principle that time-determination requires knowledge of substances, which he then reinvokes in the Refutation of Idealism in application to the time-determination of subjective states in order to refute "veil of perception" skepticism.
14 This interpretation is supported by two obvious features of the parts of the Critique which address "veil of perception" skepticism. First, they appear "tacked on" to the main body of the work. Thus, after the first three Paralogisms have all been concerned with exposing rational psychology's fallacious inferences to doctrines about the soul, the Fourth Paralogism's concern with answering "veil of perception" skepticism looks a very odd man out; and in the case of the Refutation of Idealism, not only does its sandwiching into the Postulates of Empirical Thought give it the same appearance, but of course this time we know that this is due to its having been tacked on. Second, these parts of the Critique show extraordinary instability. Having in the first edition pursued one line of argument against "veil of perception" skepticism in the Fourth Paralogism, Kant then scraps it and substitutes an entirely different one in the second edition's Refutation of Idealism, and then tries a number of variants of the latter in subsequent Reflexionen. This again strongly suggests that the material has the character of afterthoughts added to the main body of the work.
15 Cf. H.J. de Vleeschauwer, "Wie ich jetzt die Kritik der reinen Vernunft entwicklungsgeschichtlich lese," in Kant Studien, 1962-3. dogmatic slumber and gave my investigations in the field of speculative philosophy a quite new direction." 16 On the other hand, in a letter to Garve from 1798 he says that it was the Antinomies that played this role. 17 Faced with the apparent inconsistency between these two passages, one commentator resorts to the hypothesis that Kant is simply senile in the latter! 18 However, this explanation is implausible. For one thing, Kant repeats the same claim in the more formal context of the 1794 Prize Essay. 19 The proper explanation is more complicated and interesting. Both passages contain a large measure of truth. They refer to two different, but equally important, historical steps which Kant took in his protracted escape from the clutches of dogmatic metaphysics towards the (supposed) safe haven of the critical philosophy. Each step consisted in his recognition of and reaction to a kind of skepticism confronting dogmatic metaphysics, though the kinds of skepticism involved were very different in the two cases. The letter to Garve refers to an encounter with Pyrrhonian skepticism in the mid-1760s, whereas the Prolegomena refers to an encounter with Humean skepticism in or shortly after 1772. Let me explain, beginning with the letter to Garve.
IV. The letter to Garve alludes to a crise pyrrhonienne which came to dominate Kant's attitude to metaphysics in the mid-1760s. The allusion is slightly misleading, in that it suggests that Kant's original escape from dogmatic metaphysics was due to the impact of just the four Antinomies of the Critique. A careful formulation would have said (1) that it was due to the impact of a family of problems which had the same general structure and 16 Kants ges. Schr., vol. 4, p. 260. 17 "The antinomy of pure reason -'The world has a beginning; it has no beginning, and so on,' right up to the fourth [sic] : 'There is freedom in man, versus there is no freedom, only the necessity of nature' -that is what first aroused me from my dogmatic slumber and drove me to the critique of reason itself, in order to resolve the scandal of ostensible contradiction of reason with itself" (Emmanuel Kant: Philosophical Correspondence 1759-99, tr. A. Zweig [Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1986], p. 252). subject matter as the Critique's Antinomies, and (2) that these included, but were not restricted to, versions of the Critique's Antinomies. But modestly refined in this way, the letter's testimony can be confirmed, and the impact moreover dated to about 1765.
Thus, concerning (1): The general structure of the Critique's Antinomies is one of setting pairs of (apparently) contrary propositions into opposition to each other and furnishing them with supporting arguments of equal strength. Their general subject matter is the set of supersensible items treated by traditional "special metaphysics": God, the world as a whole, and the human soul. Now the letter to Garve's implication that problems of this general sort motivated Kant's original disaffection with traditional metaphysics and moved him towards the critical philosophy is confirmed, and the date of this process fixed to about 1765, by a letter Kant wrote to Bernouilli in 1781 in which he identifies problems with this general structure and subject matter as the original source of his ambition to reform metaphysics, and indicates that this stimulus was already at work on him in 1765. 20 And concerning point (2): On the one hand, early versions of the Critique's Antinomies were indeed already of concern to Kant by 1765. 21 On the other hand, he had not yet brought them together into the Critique's canonical system of four, 22 and was also concerned with further "antinomies" over and above those four. 23 So the stimulus at work in 1765 included but was not restricted to the Antinomies of the Critique.
This crisis in the mid-1760s was Pyrrhonian in two senses. First, it was Pyrrhonian in character. Specifically, it was so both in virtue of the general structure of the problems raised against metaphysical claims, namely a setting of each claim against a contrary 20 Emmanuel Kant: Philosophical Correspondence 1759-99, p. 97, cf. pp. 46-7. 21 See N. Hinske, Kants Weg zur Transzendentalphilosophie (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1970 Dreams of a Spirit Seer of 1766 (where the examples concern the philosophy of mind). Cf. Hinske, op. cit., claim and demonstration that equally strong arguments could be given on both sides, 24 and in virtue of their result, namely a suspension of judgment about the issues involved. 25 For this is precisely ancient Pyrrhonism's procedure of establishing isostheneia or "equipollence" (lit. "equal force on both sides"), with the result of producing epochê or "suspension of judgment" -a procedure which Sextus Empiricus, the main spokesman of ancient Pyrrhonism, aptly describes as "the main basic principle of the skeptic system." 26 Second, this crisis was also largely Pyrrhonian in inspiration. Seer, Illustrated by Dreams of Metaphysics. Following his decision to apply the zetetic or equipollence method to metaphysics had by now led him to the conclusion that the promise of knowledge about the supersensible which had hitherto been the discipline's main claim to fame was hollow. He therefore now advocated abandonment of supersensuous metaphysics as a spurious discipline, bidding his readers resist its temptations and instead confine themselves to "the lowly ground of experience and the common understanding" 30 -by which, he makes clear, he means empirical, mathematical, moral, and logical cognition. 31 He did salvage for "metaphysics" the task of serving as a "science of the bounds of human reason" ensuring that our judgments are based on "empirical concepts . . . upon which all our judgments must at all times rest." 32 However, this essentially just amounted to putting a new discipline under the old name. Pyrrhonism, for which each of these concepts functioned as a normative ideal.
In sum, Dreams of a Spirit Seer of 1766 represents a Kantian crise pyrrhonienne in full flower, and is indeed to all intents and purposes a self-consciously Pyrrhonian work.
Kant's position from the mid-1760s that, unlike other disciplines, traditional metaphysics, in transcending experience, succumbs to the Pyrrhonian equipollence problem, and therefore requires radical reform, survives to hold a prominent place in the critical philosophy's explanations of the motives behind its own reform of metaphysics. 36 In these later explanations Kant is largely thinking of the canonical four Antinomies of the Critique. However, they also suggests a broader concern with equipollence problems afflicting metaphysics. And this impression is reinforced by the fact that Kant not only preceded the critical philosophy with such broader concerns (as we saw), but also explicitly returned to them after the Critique, adding in the Critique of Practical Reason, the Critique of Judgment, and Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone further "antinomies" over and above the canonical four. The critical philosophy is still concerned with Pyrrhonian equipollence problems afflicting metaphysics in a way which not only includes but also extends beyond the canonical four Antinomies.
V. Let us now consider the other skeptical impulse which, according to Kant, this time in the Prolegomena, awoke him from his dogmatic metaphysical slumber and gave his 34 See in Kants ges. Schr., vol. 24: Logik Blomberg, Logik Herder, p. 4; Logik Philippi, p. 330. 35 Kants ges. Schr., vol. 2, pp. 318, 368 (the useful); 368, 373 (happiness); 351, .
36 For example, the first edition Critique opens with a lament that in resorting to principles which "overstep all possible empirical employment . . . human reason precipitates itself into darkness and contradictions; and while it may indeed conjecture that these must be in some way due to concealed errors, it is not in a position to be able to detect them. For since the principles of which it is making use transcend the limits of experience, they are no longer subject to any empirical test. The battlefield of these endless controversies is called metaphysics" (Aviii; cf. B22-3; Prolegomena, pp. 255, 271).
In order to see how and when these impinged on Kant's development, we must return The initial impulse behind this second awakening came from Kant himself rather than from Hume, however. In a famous letter to Herz from 1772 Kant has two second thoughts about the sort of supersensuous metaphysics he had adopted in the Inaugural Dissertation. First, he has a worry concerning the ability of concepts to refer to supersensible objects: It is clear enough, he argues, that a concept can refer to an object if the object is the cause of the concept, as in the case of concepts belonging to sensibility (sensibility being defined in the Inaugural Dissertation as the capacity of the subject to be affected by the presence of an object). It is also clear enough that a concept can refer to an object if the concept is the cause of the object, as would be the case for the concepts which belonged to a divine archetypal intellect. But since the intellect's concepts of supersensible noumena as envisaged by the Inaugural Dissertation refer in neither of these two ways, it is unclear how they can refer at all. Second, he has a worry concerning the possibility of knowing about supersensible noumena in the manner envisaged by the Inaugural Dissertation. This time his concern is the simple one that (problems about 41 Kant Selections (New York: Macmillan, 1988), pp. 54, 57. reference aside) it is unclear how one could have a knowledge of things not attained through experience of them. 42 The two remaining Humean views about causation correspond closely to these two worries, and seem to have contributed to Kant's development away from the metaphysics of the Inaugural Dissertation shortly after Kant wrote to Herz in 1772. As is well known, the publication in 1772 of a German translation of Beattie's An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth probably played a role here, because this for the first time gave Kant access to Hume's view about the causal principle (only stated in the Treatise).
The role played by the two Humean views in the development of Kant's thought had in each case two sides in tension with each other: On the one hand, the general principles which lay behind these Humean views suggested to Kant more refined ways of reformulating his own two worries. On the other hand, and in tension with that, the specific subject matters of Hume's views -the concept of causal necessity and the causal principle -furnished Kant with especially instructive test-cases for the (now refined) worries, suggesting that there had, in fact, to be something wrong with them, and thus pointing the way towards a metaphysics which might survive their attack.
Consider first Hume's analysis of the concept of causal necessity. The general principle which drove him to this analysis was that every idea requires an antecedent impression as its source. Kant had long been familiar with such a position. 43 possibility of concepts which cause their objects, that worry had basically been that concepts not derived from sensibility and thereby causally dependent on their objects could not refer. Now Hume with his "No impression, no idea" principle had gone one step further than that: concepts not derived from sensible antecedents could certainly not refer because they could not even exist. Kant evidently found Hume's principle sufficiently plausible to take this more radical worry seriously in addition to his own. Accordingly, these two worries later together constitute the fundamental problematic of the Metaphysical and Transcendental Deductions in the Critique. 45 To say that Kant found Hume's "No impression, no idea" principle and the radical worry which flowed from it plausible is not, however, to say that he ultimately accepted them. On the contrary, one reason why he found Hume's application of the principle to the particular concept of causal necessity so enlightening was precisely that this application provided a sort of prima facie reduction to absurdity of the principle: Thanks largely to the perspicuity of this concept's existence and character, the application of the principle to it could be clearly seen to lead unavoidably to an erroneous conclusionnamely, Hume's conclusion that the concept, if it existed at all, expressed, not a relation between causally related items themselves, but instead merely the mind's reaction to constant conjunction. In Kant's view, the concept clearly did exist, but it just as clearly did not express that. Therefore the Humean principle had to be false. 46 An additional reason why Kant found Hume's example enlightening, I suggest, is that he saw in it similar instruction concerning his own original, less radical worry about reference.
Hume's examination of the concept of cause, once corrected by Kant so as to excise its mistaken derivation of the essential component concept of necessity from a subjective 45 For example, both are in Kant's mind at the very start of the Critique's Transcendental Deduction, where he first says that the problem is whether a priori concepts have "a meaning, an imagined significance" (A84 / B116-17), i.e. the more radical Humean worry, and then that it is how they can "relate to objects which they yet do not obtain from any experience" (A85 / B117), i.e. Kant's own original worry. impression, had shown it to be a concept containing an essential component concept not derivable from sensible antecedents. 47 Yet it must have seemed clear to Kant on reflection that the concepts of cause in general and causal necessity in particular nevertheless do succeed in referring to things, since, despite their non-derivability from sensation, they are instantiated in experience in a broader, everyday sense of "experience" (we do in some sense see thrown rocks causing windows to break, etc.), and are moreover indispensable to the outlooks of common sense and natural science alike. 48 In consequence, Kant's own original worry now looked as though it had to be mistaken. To put these two points in another way: As long as the focus had been on such hazy, lofty, and dispensable metaphysical terms as, for example, "God," Hume's radical worry and Kant's own original worry had looked plausible; perhaps such terms really did fail of meaning or at least reference. But once it was realized that the same two worries would apply, if at all, just as much to such perspicuous, experiential, and indispensable concepts as "cause" as well, it was the worries that came to look misconceived.
Consider next the other Humean view about causation referred to by the Prolegomena, the view that knowledge of the causal principle must be based on experience, since its denial is not self-contradictory or inconceivable in the way required for a priori knowledge to be possible. Once again, this view played two roles in Kant's development in tension with each other, this time in connection with his own worry that it is unclear how the intellect could have knowledge about things of which it has no experience.
On the one hand: The general doctrine which lay behind Hume's view about the causal principle was his notorious "fork," long familiar to Kant from the Enquiry. As formulated in the Enquiry, the "fork" consisted of the following claims. First, all known truths are 47 Thus in the Critique Kant writes that "the concept of a cause involves the character of necessity, which no experience can yield" (A112; cf. A91 / B123-4).
48 Thus in a passage of the Metaphysik von Schön from the critical period Kant characterizes such a priori concepts as, unlike a priori concepts like the concept of God, those "to which an object in our experience corresponds," those which "have . . . objective reality, they can be measured off from the object of experience," those "which we really need in order to understand the objects which present themselves" (Kants ges. Schr., vol. 28, pt. 1, p. 470). divisible into two kinds: "relations of ideas," defined by Hume as propositions "intuitively or demonstratively certain," by which he seems to mean such that their denials either are or imply contradictions; and "matters of fact," defined as all the rest.
Second, while relations of ideas "are discoverable by the mere operation of thought," or a priori, matters of fact are only knowable by means of experience, or a posteriori. 49 Third and consequently, if it is found that a proposition -Hume adds with pretended casualness, "of divinity or school metaphysics for instance" -is neither certain by virtue of its denial being or implying a contradiction nor known by means of experience, then we may "commit it . . . to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion." 50 Since it seemed clear to Hume that the causal principle was not known by virtue of its denial being or implying a contradiction, his only option, short of rejecting it as "sophistry and illusion," was to say that it was known by means of experience. How did Hume's "fork" enable Kant to reformulate his own worry more cogently? The "fork" shared with his worry an assumption that a posteriori knowledge of things is, generally speaking, unproblematic. But the "fork" alerted him to something his own worry had overlooked, namely that there is also a substantial class of a priori cognitions which are unproblematic: those true simply in virtue of the law of contradiction (in Hume's terminology, relations of ideas; in Kant's, analytic judgments). Kant readily took this qualification to heart. 51 In this way the "fork" enabled him to formulate a more refined version of his own original worry. His worry was now no longer that it was unclear how there could be a priori knowledge generally, but how there could be a priori knowledge not belonging to the unproblematic class based on the law of contradiction (in Kant's terminology: a priori judgments which are not "analytic" but "synthetic"). This worry, On the other hand: Hume's view about the causal principle was also important for Kant because the causal principle specifically constituted an illuminating test-case for the nowrefined worry about supersensuous metaphysics (in effect, the objection that there is no such thing as synthetic a priori knowledge). Kant agreed with Hume that the causal principle was a clear case of genuine knowledge -for (though not derived from) it is supported by confirming instances in experience, and fundamental to the outlooks of common sense and natural science alike. 53 He also agreed with Hume that the principle was synthetic. However, the conclusion to which Hume had been driven when he had applied his denial of synthetic a priori knowledge to this principle, namely that it was not known a priori but only a posteriori, seemed to Kant clearly false, in particular because of the strict universality belonging to the principle. 54 Consequently, scrutiny of the causal principle afforded, in Kant's view, a strong prima facie disproof, or reduction to absurdity, of the denial that there could be synthetic a priori knowledge. 55 To put the point another way: As long as the focus had been on such lofty and questionable synthetic a priori claims as that God had such and such characteristics or performed such and such acts, the worry that one could not have any synthetic a priori knowledge had looked plausible; perhaps one could not know anything of that sort. But once it was realized that this worry 52 That Hume's "fork," as illustrated in his treatment of the causal principle, did in this way lead Kant to the central puzzle of the critical philosophy is reflected in remarks at Critique, B19-20.
53 In a passage from his 1794-5 lectures on metaphysics, Kant writes: "Experience confirms e.g. the rational propositions: in all changes substance never vanishes but only the form of things, or: each change has its cause; so much so that one simply accepts them without investigating their basis, and one already becomes certain through experience of their truth under all circumstances" (Kants ges. Schr., vol. 29, pt. 1, 2, .
54 See Critique, B4-5.
55 For Kant, scrutiny of mathematics afforded a further disproof of this denial with at least equal force. equally challenged such empirically confirmed and fundamental beliefs as the causal principle, it was the worry that came to look misconceived.
In short, the two Humean skeptical views about causation enabled Kant both to refine his own worries about supersensuous metaphysics and to show that, even so refined, there had in fact to be something wrong with them, so that the prospects for metaphysics were after all brighter than they had implied.
The latter step is reminiscent of a strategy characteristic of the Scottish common sense school: when a philosopher like Hume advances a philosophical principle which entails a deeply counterintuitive consequence, one holds fast to the intuitive position under attack and converts his modus ponendo ponens argument into a modus tollendo tollens argument denying his principle. Beattie in particular uses this strategy, and I suspect that Kant was influenced by him here. Kant's line of thought thus includes what one might call a common sense moment. However, unlike the common sense school, Kant considered this only a prima facie response, still in need of fuller defense and elaboration.
In sum, Kant's reflections in or shortly after 1772 on Hume's treatments of the concept of causal necessity and the causal principle in these ways brought him to a deeper (though not yet final) understanding than he had achieved alone in his letter to Herz of two major puzzles bearing on the possibility of metaphysics: a double puzzle about the existence and reference of a priori concepts, and a puzzle about the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge. It is mainly this process that he has in mind in the Prolegomena when he credits Hume with having roused him from the slumber of dogmatic metaphysics and given his thought a quite new direction.
VI. Having identified the skeptical problems concerning metaphysics to which Kant in his letter to Garve and in the Prolegomena attributes his escape from dogmatic slumber in the discipline, and seen when and how they roused him, let us now consider his attempt in the critical philosophy to generate a reformed metaphysics which could be defended against them, and his attempt there so to defend it. I begin with the question of what the critical philosophy's reformed metaphysics is like, and how in general it has been reformed in order to enable it to cope with the skeptical problems.
Kant is concerned with metaphysics as a science. As he puts it in the Prolegomena, "Metaphysics must be a science . . . ; otherwise it is nothing at all." 56 We may therefore confine our focus to metaphysics in this strict sense (neglecting various other senses of the word which he uses).
His reflections on skepticism as charted so far suggest that he will want to impose the following two requirements on any acceptable science of metaphysics:
(1) It should exclude traditional metaphysics' claims about supersensible items, which run into Pyrrhonian equipollence problems, and instead include all and only those (nonmathematical) a priori concepts and synthetic a priori principles which seem obviously legitimate in light of their perspicuity, confirmation by experience, and fundamentalness to common sense and science (such as the concept of cause and the causal principle).
(2) It should advance these in such a way that they can be more fully defended than by this appearance of obvious legitimacy alone against both the Pyrrhonian and the Humeinfluenced skeptical problems.
These, I suggest, were indeed the main requirements which guided Kant in his reform of metaphysics. Accordingly, in partial response to requirement (1), a fundamental step of Kant's in reforming metaphysics is to exclude putative information about supersensible items, such as God, the world as a whole, and the soul (the subjects dealt with by traditional special metaphysics). 57 56 Prolegomena, p. 371.
57 He recognizes that such knowledge has traditionally been the primary goal of metaphysics, but he now believes that our knowledge is limited to objects of possible experience in a way that makes it impossible (see Critique, Bxix). All that can be done for convictions about supersensible items, and even then only in very limited cases, is to provide a defense of them, not as science or knowledge, but as morally based faith (see ibid., Bxix-xxii, Bxxx-xxxi).
world is merely apparent (as transcendental idealism says), the two equally compelling arguments of a "Mathematical" Antinomy do not contradict each other after all; both thesis and antithesis can be false, as the arguments (allegedly) prove they are. 73 In the case of the "Dynamical" Antinomies, we have (Kant alleges) compelling proofs both for the thesis and for the antithesis -e.g. in the Third Antinomy, both for there being freedom, or uncaused causation by the will, and for there being no freedom but instead only thoroughgoing causation. This again seems to yield a contradiction. However, if, and only if, transcendental idealism's claim that the realm of nature is mere appearance and distinct from the realm of things as they are in themselves is correct, then the thesis and the antithesis can be consistent and both true (namely, of different realms). So, once again, if, and only if, transcendental idealism is true, these Antinomies can be resolved. 74 However, as I suggested earlier, Kant's concern in the Critique about metaphysics' "vacillating . . . state of uncertainty and contradiction" also extends beyond the canonical four Antinomies (as in the precritical period). So one may reasonably ask whether his idea of solving this problem via his solutions to the Hume-influenced problems does not include more than just these well-known strategies for addressing the four Antinomies. I believe that it does, that it also includes a much less well-known strategy designed to liberate metaphysics from Pyrrhonian equipollence skepticism more broadly.
Shortly after the passage recently quoted Kant returns to the problem of "unavoidable contradictions" in metaphysics, describing it as a threat of "dogmatic assertions to which other assertions, equally specious, can always be opposed -that is . . . skepticism." 75 And he indicates the following strategy for solving it: "It must be possible for reason to attain to certainty whether we know or do not know the objects of metaphysics, that is, to come to a decision either in regard to the objects of its enquiries or in regard to the capacity or 73 Ibid., A502-7 / B530-5.
74 Ibid., A529-32 / B557-60, A536-7 / B564-5, A559-64 / B587-92. incapacity of reason to pass any judgment upon them, so that we may either with confidence extend our pure reason or set to it sure and determinate limits." 76 This implies a twofold strategy for addressing Pyrrhonian equipollence skepticism: on the one hand, produce certain knowledge of some pieces of metaphysics by establishing both the facts in question ("the objects of its enquiries") and our ability to know them ("the capacity . . . of reason to pass any judgment upon them"); on the other hand, produce certain knowledge that we do not and cannot have knowledge of other metaphysical matters.
This twofold strategy is, I suggest, more specifically as follows. First, Kant believesreasonably given his understanding of Pyrrhonism as a restrained form of skepticismthat his solutions to the Hume-influenced problems on behalf of particular metaphysical concepts and principles are such that the Pyrrhonist is bound to accept these solutions too. Consider, in particular, Kant's transcendental argument proofs that. Kant evidently understands the conditional propositions of the form "Necessarily if there is experience then a priori concept C refers / synthetic a priori principle p is true" which form the core of these proofs to be just as irresistible for a Pyrrhonist, once demonstrated to him, as they are for the Hume-influenced skeptic. For Kant believes the Critique's essential contents generally, and one must therefore suppose these in particular, to be "the measure, and therefore . . . the paradigm, of all apodeictic . . . certainty." 77 Furthermore, the Pyrrhonist, as Kant conceives him, does not in general question experiential judgments.
He is therefore also bound to accept the proposition "There is experience." Finally, there is no question of Kant's Pyrrhonist questioning logical principles, such as modus ponendo ponens. So he is bound to infer from those two premises the consequents of the conditional propositions in question: propositions of the form "A priori concept C refers / synthetic a priori principle p is true." Similar points apply to Kant's transcendental idealist explanations of the possibility of our referring with / knowing particular 76 Ibid., B22.
77 Ibid., Axv. metaphysical a priori concepts and synthetic a priori principles. Since these explanations are among the essential contents of the Critique, they too are evidently understood by him to possess "apodeictic . . . certainty." In short, Kant thinks that the Pyrrhonist cannot but accept the proofs and explanations which he has already provided vindicating particular metaphysical concepts and principles. These parts of metaphysics at least can therefore be saved from the threat of Pyrrhonian equipollence.
The second side of Kant's strategy is as follows. Providing, in the way just described, a defense compelling for the Pyrrhonist of a small number of metaphysical concepts and principles would settle only a modest subset of the myriad "intestine wars" between metaphysical claims to which the Critique attributes skepticism about metaphysics. 78 However, Kant envisages a way of proceeding from this modicum of metaphysical peace to the end of all disputes in metaphysics, and hence the complete liberation of the discipline from the Pyrrhonian problem. His strategy is not to settle the remaining disputes, but to show that they do not belong within the discipline of metaphysics.
One pillar supporting his case here is his fundamental assumption that metaphysics properly so called is of its very essence a science (a Wissenschaft). This implies, at a minimum, that its principles must not only be true but also constitute knowledge (Wissen). Another pillar is a conviction that his solutions to the Hume-influenced problems, his proofs and explanations for particular metaphysical a priori concepts and synthetic a priori principles, not only establish that these do constitute knowledge in the domain of metaphysics, but also provide a basis for demonstrating that other principles currently counted by people as belonging within that domain cannot constitute knowledge. 79 He believes that this demonstration in fact shows that none of the principles currently counted by people as falling within that domain except for those which he has 78 Ibid., Aix.
79 This is what he has in mind when he writes that the critical philosophy furnishes in connection with metaphysics "a standard . . . to our judgment whereby knowledge may be with certainty distinguished from pseudoknowledge" (Prolegomena, p. 383; cf. Critique, A12 / B26). vindicated in the course of solving the Hume-influenced problems can constitute knowledge. If this can indeed be shown, then, given the requirement that metaphysics must of its very essence be knowledge, all these other principles can properly be expelled from metaphysics and left to conduct their "intestine wars" elsewhere.
How, though, does he hope to demonstrate that all principles currently counted as belonging within metaphysics except for those which he has vindicated can constitute nothing better than pseudo-knowledge? The answer lies in his conviction that, as he puts it, "metaphysics . . . is the only science which promises . . . completion," and the critical philosophy can achieve a demonstrably "complete knowledge" of "reason itself and its pure thinking." 80 By this, he means that the critical philosophy can demonstrate the completeness of the conceptual sources and fundamental principles of metaphysical knowledge which it vindicates, their exhaustion of metaphysical knowledge.
This demonstration depends on the critical philosophy's claim to show that these conceptual sources and fundamental principles of metaphysical knowledge constitute together an entire system. 81 For it is a recurrent and central theme in Kant that the way to demonstrate that an aggregate of items of some particular kind constitutes a complete collection of items of that kind is to show that they constitute together, not only all items of that kind which one can discover, but also an entire system. 82 Accordingly, a passage from the Von Schön Metaphysics implies that the full solution to the problem of equipollence skepticism in metaphysics lies, not only in validating specific conceptual sources and fundamental principles of metaphysical knowledge by proving that and explaining how they constitute such, but also in establishing that the 82 See Critique, A64-5 / B89; cf. A66-7 / B91-2, A80-1 / B106-7; Prolegomena, p. 322. Note that the inference here from entire system to complete collection is not, as it might appear, a trivial one.
sphere of the conceptual sources and fundamental principles of metaphysical knowledge is thereby exhausted by showing that they constitute together an entire system. 83 The critical philosophy's demonstration in response to equipollence skepticism that its collection of the conceptual sources and fundamental principles of metaphysical knowledge is complete therefore ultimately rests on the notorious systematic or "architectonic" aspects of the Critique, which aim to exhibit their entire systematicity.
More specifically, Kant's idea is as follows: Given that the twelve logical forms of judgment constitute an entire system, we can demonstrate that our collection of metaphysical a priori concepts of the understanding does so as well by showing that they correspond one-to-one with those logical forms of judgment. 84 And given now that our collection of metaphysical a priori concepts of the understanding constitutes an entire system, we can see that our collection of metaphysical synthetic a priori principles does so as well by showing that they in turn correspond one-to-one with the metaphysical a priori concepts of the understanding. 85 To give an example of how these correspondences are supposed to work: the hypothetical form of judgment, "If A then B," corresponds to the a priori concept of causation, since it yields the idea of the consequence of one thing upon another that is the core of the concept of causation; 86 and the pure concept of causation then in turn corresponds to the synthetic a priori principle that every event has a cause (for obvious reasons).
Since, in Kant's view, the Critique's demonstration that its collection of the conceptual sources and fundamental principles of metaphysical knowledge is complete possesses, like the rest of the work's contents, "apodeictic . . . certainty," it will again, in his view, be 83 Kants ges. Schr., vol. 28, pt. 1, 84 Critique, A64-81 / B89-107; Prolegomena, pp. 322-6; Preisschrift über die Fortschritte der Metaphysik, pp. 271-2.
85 Critique, A148 / B187, A161 / B200. Kant gives a helpful tabular summary of all the above correspondences at Prolegomena, pp. 302-3.
86 Critique, A243 / B301. Cf. Metaphysik Volckmann, in Kants ges. Schr., vol. 28, pt. 1, p. 404. such that the Pyrrhonist cannot but accept it once it is laid out for him. Consequently, the Pyrrhonist can be compelled to admit, not only that these sources and principles provide metaphysical knowledge, but also that all the remaining principles whose battles have hitherto sullied and might continue to sully the name of the discipline belong outside it.
IX. This, then, is Kant's grand strategy in the critical philosophy for defending a reformed metaphysics against the skeptical problems which arose to threaten the discipline of metaphysics in the mid 1760s to early 1770s, causing him to reshape the discipline in order to enable it to withstand them. Reformed and defended against those skeptical problems in the ways sketched above, metaphysics at last in the critical philosophy emerges "on the secure path of science." 87 Such, at least, is Kant's belief.
87 Critique, Bxiv.
